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Abstract—Reliable packet delivery within stringent delay-
constraints is of paramount importance to mission-critical com-
puter applications with hard real-time constraints. Because re-
transmission and coding techniques counteract the delay re-
quirements, reliability may be achieved through replication over
multiple fail-independent paths. Existing solutions, such as the
parallel redundancy protocol (PRP), replicate all packets at
the MAC layer over parallel paths. PRP works best in local
area networks. However, it is not viable for IP networks that
are a key element of emerging mission-critical systems. This
limitation, coupled with diagnostic inability and lack of security,
renders PRP unsuitable for reliable data-delivery in these IP
networks. To address this issue, we present a transport-layer
solution: the IP parallel redundancy protocol (iPRP). Designing
iPRP poses non-trivial challenges in the form of selective packet-
replication, soft-state and multicast support. iPRP replicates only
time-critical unicast or multicast UDP traffic. iPRP requires no
modifications to the existing monitoring application, end-device
operating system or to the intermediate network devices. It only
requires a simple software installation on the end-devices. iPRP
has a set of diagnostic tools for network debugging. With our
implementation of iPRP in Linux, we show that iPRP supports
multiple flows with minimal processing-and-delay overhead. It is
being installed in our campus smart-grid network and is publicly
available.
I. INTRODUCTION
Specific mission-critical computer applications have hard
delay-constraints. Failure to satisfy these constraints can result
in economic losses or, even worse, human lives can be endan-
gered in cases when these failures affect safety mechanisms.
Notable examples of such applications (often built on top of
cyber-physical systems) are process-control and emergency-
management applications in the oil and gas industry [1], real-
time detection of pollutants in the water/wastewater industry
[2], vehicle-collision avoidance in car industry [3], automatic
train control [4], process control in chemical industry [5], state
estimation in smart grid [6], high-frequency trading [7] and
distributed online gaming [8].
Reliable and timely packet delivery, even in the order of
10 ms, is of utmost importance in satisfying the hard-delay
constraints. The classic approaches to reliable communication
through coding and retransmission are not compatible with the
hard delay-constraints. An alternative is to achieve reliability
through replication over multiple fail-independent paths, which
is the focus of this paper. More precisely, we present a solution
for packet-replication over multiple paths in IP networks.
Indeed, as we discuss next, existing solutions apply to MAC-
layer networks and cannot be transposed to IP networks that
are a requirement for many of the aforementioned applications.
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A. From MAC- to IP-Layer Parallel Redundancy Protocol
The parallel redundancy protocol (PRP) IEC standard [9]
was proposed as a solution to packet replication over multiple
fail-independent paths for local area networks (LANs) where
there are no routers. Communicating devices need to be con-
nected to two cloned (disjoint) bridged networks. The sender
tags MAC frames with a sequence number and replicates them
over its two interfaces. The receiver discards redundant frames
based on sequence numbers.
In addition to extending PRP functionality to IP networks,
the new design should also avoid the drawbacks of PRP. The
most limiting feature of PRP is that the two cloned networks
need to be composed of devices with identical MAC addresses.
This contributes to making network management difficult.
Furthermore, PRP duplicates all the traffic unselectively, which
is acceptable for use in a local environment, but which cannot
be done in general IP networks, because some links can be ex-
pensive and unnecessary traffic should be avoided. Moreover,
PRP has no security mechanisms.
Note that a parallel redundancy protocol for IP networks
needs to support IP multicast, as this is used in many of the
aforementioned applications.
Fig. 1: A typical iPRP use-case in the context of smart grids.
Devices (Phasor Data Concentrators (PDC), Phasor Measurement
Units (PMU)) are connected to two overlapping network subclouds
(labeled A and B). Some devices use an additional LTE connection
providing a low-latency cellular service [10]. Every PMU streams
data to all PDCs, using UDP and IP multicast.
For a running example, we use the smart-grid communi-
cation network depicted in Fig. 1. Here, measurements are
streamed periodically (every 20 ms for 50 Hz systems) by
phasor measurement units (PMUs) to phasor data concentrators
(PDCs), where the information about the electrical network
state is expected in quasi-real time. PRP cannot be directly
deployed here: devices are multi-homed and each interface
is assigned a different IP address. Most devices have two
interfaces connected to a main network cloud made of two
fail-independent network subclouds labeled “A” and “B”, while
some have a third interface connected to a 4G cellular wireless
service (labeled “Swisscom LTE backbone” in the figure). It
is assumed that paths between interfaces connected to the “A”
network subcloud stay within it (and similarly with “B”). The
“A” and “B” network subclouds could be physically separated,
however in practice they are most likely interconnected for
network management reasons.
A simple way to achieve the arrangement described before
is to divide the network into two logical subclouds, A and B.
Then, by adjusting the routing weights of the links intercon-
necting the A and B subclouds, we can ensure that A→ A and
B → B traffic stays within A and B subclouds, respectively,
thereby giving rise to fail-independent paths. In such a setting,
the interconnections will be used only for A↔ B traffic.
We need a solution that, similarly to PRP, takes advantage
of network redundancy for increasing reliability and works in
scenarios such as the one in Fig. 1. The existence of fail-
independent paths is fundamental for the optimal operation of
such a solution. However, in the event of a network-component
failure, the paths can partially overlap. Then, the solution
should reap the maximum possible benefits by operating in a
degraded-redundancy mode. In other words, if complete end-
to-end redundancy is no longer possible, the solution should
continue to work.
In order for our solution to be easily deployed, we also
require it to be transparent to both the application and net-
work layers: it should only require installation at end-devices
and no modifications to running application software or to
intermediary network devices (routers or bridges). In addition,
real-time applications typically use UDP rather than TCP
because (1) TCP does not work with IP multicast or (2) TCP
retransmissions, following packet losses, require several round-
trip times and can be both detrimental and superfluous. Hence,
we target a solution that supports UDP applications only.
In this paper we present the design and implementation of
iPRP (the IP parallel redundancy protocol), a transport layer
solution for transparent replication of unidirectional unicast or
multicast UDP flows on multihomed devices.
B. iPRP
An iPRP host has to send different copies of the same
packet over different paths. With the current technology, a
device cannot control the path taken by an IP packet, beyond
the choice of a destination address, exit interface and a type-
of-service value. Other fields, such as the IPv6 flow label
or source routing header extensions, are either ignored or
rejected by routers. Also, the type-of-service field is used by
applications and should not be tampered with by iPRP. Hence,
we assume that a choice of the path is done at the sources by
choosing communication interface and the destination address.
The job of iPRP is then to transparently replicate packets over
the different interfaces for the UDP flows that need it, match
corresponding interfaces, remove duplicates at the receiver, and
do this in a way that is resilient to crashes (see Section V-G).
Not all traffic requires replication, only certain devices and
certain UDP flows do (time-critical data). Hence, replication
needs to be selective: a failure-proof mechanism, transparent
to applications, is required for detecting and managing packet
replication. It needs to correctly match the interfaces, so that
independent paths are used whenever they exist.
The iPRP protocol design is such that it does not interfere
with the existing security mechanisms and does not introduce
any new security weaknesses (see Section VI).
iPRP assumes that the network is traffic-engineered; the
critical UDP data streams receive enough resources and are not
subject to congestion. iPRP instantly repairs packet losses due
to failures or transient problems such as transmission losses. It
does not solve congestion problems due to under-dimensioned
network links. TCP flows are not affected.
Our iPRP implementation is for IPv6, as it is being installed
in our smart-grid communication network (smartgrid.epfl.ch),
that uses IPv6 (following the argument that new network
environments should avoid future transition problems and
embrace IPv6 from the start). Our implementation is available
at http://goo.gl/N5wFNt. Adaptation to IPv4 is straightforward.
II. RELATED WORK
As mentioned in Section I, iPRP overcomes the limitations
of PRP [9]. The authors of [11] are aware of the fact that PRP
is limited to LANs and suggest a direction for developing PRP
in an IP environment. Their suggestion is neither fully designed
nor implemented. Also, it requires that the intermediate routers
preserve the PRP trailers at the MAC layer, which in turn
requires changes in all of the routers in the networks. It does
not address all the shortcomings of PRP (diagnostic tools, lack
of multicast support, need of special hardware). In contrast, our
transport layer approach does not have these drawbacks.
Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [12] is used in multi-homed
hosts. It allows TCP flows to exploit the host’s multiple
interfaces, thus increasing the available bandwidth for the
application. Like MPTCP, iPRP is a transport layer solution
and is transparent to network and application. Unlike MPTCP,
iPRP replicates the UDP packets on the parallel paths, while
MPTCP sends one TCP segment on only one of them. In a
case of loss, MPTCP resends the segment on the same path
until enough evidence is gathered that this path is broken. So,
a lost packet is repaired after several RTTs (not good for time-
critical flows).
Similarly, link aggregation control protocol (LACP) [13]
and equal-cost multi-path routing (ECMP) [14] require seconds
for failover. LACP enables the bundling of several physical
links together to form a single logical channel. The failure of
a link is discovered through the absence of keep-alive messages
that are sent every 1− 30 s. ECMP can be used together with
most routing protocols in order to balance traffic over multiple
best paths when there is a tie. In a case of failure, it relies on
the reconfiguration of the underlying routing protocol, that is
commonly detected by the absence of keep-alive messages.
Network coding exploits network redundancy for increas-
ing throughput [15], and requires intermediary nodes to recode
packets (specialized network equipment needed). Also, it is not
suitable for time-critical applications as typically packets are
coded across “generations” which introduces decoding delays.
Source coding (e.g. Fountain codes [16]) can be useful for the
bursty transmissions of several packets. However, it adds delay,
as encoding and decoding are performed across several packets
(not suitable for UDP flows with hard-delay constraints).
Multiprotocol-label-switching transport-profile (MPLS-TP)
1 + 1 protection feature [17] performs packet duplication and
feeds identical copies of the packets in working and protection
path. On the receiver side, there exists a selector between the
two; it performs a switchover based on some predetermined
criteria. However, some time is needed for fault detection and
signaling to take place, after which the switchover occurs.
Hence, a 0-ms repair cannot be achieved.
Multi-topology routing extends existing routing protocols
(e.g. [18]) and can be used to create disjoint paths in a
single network. It does not solve the problem of transparent
packet replication, but can serve as a complement to iPRP in
the following way. On top of the underlying network (base
topology) additional class-specific topologies can be created
as a subset of base topology. We can use this feature to define
fail-independent A and B subclouds in order to ensure fail-
independent paths between sources and destinations.
Another method to ensure the discovery of fail-independent
paths is software-defined networking (SDN) [19]. Centralized
controller is aware of the overall network topology and can
impose routing rules in a way that guarantees independent
paths/trees between all the hosts.
III. A TOP-DOWN VIEW OF IPRP
In this section we first go over high-level design decisions
we had to make during the development of the iPRP protocol
and then succinctly describe the resulting design. iPRP aims
to provide reliable end-to-end communication between multi-
homed hosts. The very first question that emerges is the choice
of a TCP/IP layer where iPRP should be placed. Among others,
iPRP needs to support scenarios where the traffic is carried
over a shared network infrastructure e.g., a telecom network
operator provides connectivity for smart-grid services [20]. In
this case, end-users do not control intermediate routers. Hence,
the routers should not be aware of the existence of iPRP.
Consequently, we put network transparency as a requirement
which leads us to a solution that places iPRP above the network
layer. Taking this into account a possible solution can be to
place iPRP at the application layer. This would imply that all
legacy applications that are traditionally used would need to
undergo changes in order to be compatible with iPRP protocol.
Again, we opt for an application-transparent solution which
leads us to a choice of a transport-layer solution.
The next choice to make was whether all the traffic
originated at a sender should be replicated. Having in mind that
bandwidth over IP-network links can be of limited capacity
we opt here for a solution that replicates traffic selectively.
The control of this feature is left to users through a simple
configuration of the UDP port numbers that correspond to
services that demand high reliability of packet delivery.
The next choice was that of a mechanism to inform a sender
about the alternate IP addresses (unicast or multicast) of the
receivers, so as to establish redundant paths. Classic solutions
like PRP, use cloned address networks. Cloned IP addresses are
not an option of iPRP as users do not necessarily control and
manage all the interconnecting networks.We solve this problem
by designing lightweight, secure and crash-resilient signaling
protocol. It also takes into account specificities of the mul-
ticast communication e.g., it avoids flooding of senders with
signaling messages from large groups of multicast receivers.
It is a plug and play protocol initiated whenever a new sender
emerges and completely transparent to the application layer.
Furthermore, we needed a mechanism for discard of du-
plicates, which can cope with packet reordering due to the
network, and crash failures of the hosts. Existing duplicate-
discard mechanisms such as the one used by PRP do not
perform well under such packet-reordering and host failures.
So, we also put in place a stateless protocol for redundant-
packets removal.
The resulting design of iPRP is as follows. iPRP senders
and receivers are expected to have multiple network interfaces.
Applications are identified by the UDP port used to receive
data. To enable iPRP for a certain application at the receiver,
the port on which the application is listening needs to be
added to the list of iPRP monitored ports (see Section IV-C).
Receiving data on an iPRP monitored port automatically
triggers an iPRP session between the sender and the receiver
(see Section V). Within this session, the iPRP software running
on the source host learns the receiver’s network interfaces
from the iPRP software running on the receiver. It uses the
configured rules to match local interfaces to the receiver’s
remote ones. It then proceeds to capture the application’s
outgoing packets, encapsulates them in iPRP data messages
addressed to the receiver’s remote interfaces (according to
the determined matching), and replicates them over the local
interfaces. At the receiver, the iPRP software decapsulates
the original packets, discards duplicates (Section V-E), and
delivers them to the receiver application.
Hosts having multiple interfaces is not a strict requirement,
but is desirable. In cases where the sender or the receiver have
a single interface, iPRP still works, but the paths taken by the
replicated packets join at a certain point, which becomes a
single point of failure.
IV. OPERATION OF IPRP
A. How to Use iPRP
iPRP is installed on end-devices with multiple interfaces:
on streaming devices (the ones that generate UDP flows
with hard delay constraints) and on receiving devices (the
destinations for such flows).
Streaming devices (such as PMUs) do not require special
configuration. Streaming applications running on such devices
benefit from the increased reliability of iPRP without being
aware of its existence. iPRP operates as a modification to the
UDP layer.
On receiving devices the only thing that needs to be
configured is the set of UDP ports on which replication is
required. For example, say that an application running on a
PDC is listening on some UDP port for measurement data
coming from PMUs. After iPRP is installed, this port needs
to be added to the list of iPRP monitored ports in order to
inform iPRP that any incoming flows targeting this port require
replication. The application does not need to be stopped and
is not aware of iPRP.
Nothing else needs to be done for iPRP to work. In
particular, no special configuration is required for intermediary
network equipment (routers, bridges).
B. General Operation: Requirements for Devices and Network
iPRP provides 1 + n redundancy. It increases, by packet
replication, the reliability of UDP flows. It does not impact
TCP flows.
iPRP-enabled receiving devices configure a set of UDP
ports as monitored. When a UDP packet is received on any
of the monitored ports, a one-way soft-state iPRP session is
triggered between the sender and the receiver (or group of
receivers, if multicast is used). Soft-state means that: (i) the
state of the communication participants is refreshed period-
ically, (ii) the entire iPRP design is such that a state-refresh
message received after a cold-start is sufficient to ensure proper
operation. Consequently, the state is automatically restored
after a crash, and devices can join or leave an iPRP session
without impacting the other participants.
Within an iPRP session, each replicated packet is tagged
with an iPRP header (Section V-D). It contains the same
sequence number in all the copies of the same original packet.
At the receiver, duplicate packets with the same sequence
number are discarded (Section V-E). The original packet is
reconstructed from the first received copy and forwarded to
the application.
In multicast, all devices in the group of receivers need
to run iPRP. If by mishap only part of the receivers support
iPRP, these trigger the start of an iPRP session with the sender
and benefit from iPRP; however, the others stop receiving
data correctly. The use of source-specific multicast (SSM) is
recommended (see [21]).
All iPRP-related information is encrypted and authenti-
cated. Existing mechanisms for cryptographic key exchange
are applied (security considerations in Section VI) .
C. UDP Ports Affected by iPRP
iPRP requires two system UDP ports (transport layer) for
its use: the iPRP control port and the iPRP data port (in
our implementation 1000 and 1001, respectively). The iPRP
control port is used for exchanging messages that are part
of the soft-state maintenance. The iPRP data port receives
data messages of the established iPRP sessions. iPRP-capable
devices always listen for iPRP control and data messages.
The set of monitored UDP ports, over which iPRP repli-
cation is desired are not reserved by iPRP and can be any
UDP ports. UDP ports can be added to/removed at any time
from this set during the iPRP operation. Reception of a UDP
packet on a monitored port triggers the receiver to initiate an
iPRP session. If the sender is iPRP-capable, an iPRP session
is started (replicated packets are sent to the iPRP Data Port),
else regular communication continues.
D. Matching the Interconnected Interfaces of Different Devices
One of the design challenges of iPRP is determining an
appropriate matching between the interfaces of senders and
receivers, so that replication can occur over fail independent
paths. To understand the problem, consider Figure 1 where
the PMUs and PDCs have at least two interfaces. The A
and B network subclouds are interconnected. However, the
routing is designed such that, a flow originating at an interface
connected to subcloud A with a destination in A, will stay
in subcloud A. A potential problem can arise if a sender’s
interface, say SA, intended to be connected to the A subcloud,
is mistakenly connected to the B subcloud, and vice-versa.
Then one path from source to destination will go from SA
(on subcloud B) to the destination interface DB (on subcloud
B), and conversely on the other path. Following the routing
rules, these flows will use interconnecting links between A
and B subclouds. This is not desirable as these links can
be of insufficient capacity because they are not intended to
carry such traffic. Furthermore, it is no longer guaranteed that
such paths are disjoint. PRP avoids this problem by requiring
two physically separated and cloned networks. iPRP does not
impose these restrictions. Hence, iPRP needs a mechanism to
match interfaces connected to the same network subcloud.
To facilitate appropriate matching, each interface is asso-
ciated with a 4-bit identifier called iPRP Network subcloud
Discriminator (IND), which qualifies the network subcloud it
is connected to. The iPRP software in end-devices learns each
of the interfaces’ INDs automatically via simple preconfigured
rules. Network routers have no notion of IND. A rule can
use the interface’s IP address or its DNS name. In our
implementation, we compute each interface IND based on its
fully qualified domain name. In Figure 1, the rule in the iPRP
configuration maps the regular expression nw-a* to the IND
value 0xa, nw-b* to IND 0xb, and *swisscom.ch to IND
0xf, respectively.
The receiver periodically advertises the IP addresses of its
interfaces, along with their INDs to the sender (via iPRP_CAP
messages). The sender compares the received INDs with its
own interface INDs. Only those interfaces with matching INDs
are allowed to communicate in iPRP mode. In our example,
IND matching prevents iPRP to send data from a PMU A
interface to a PDC B interface. Moreover, each iPRP data
packet contains the IND of the network subcloud where the
packet is supposed to transit (see Section V-D). This eases the
monitoring and debugging of the whole network. It allows us
to detect misconfiguration errors that cause a packet expected
on an A interface to arrive on a B interface.
V. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
The iPRP message exchange is divided into two planes:
control plane and data plane. The control plane is responsible
for exchange of messages required to establish and maintain an
iPRP session. The data plane is responsible for replication and
de-duplication of time-critical UDP flows. Note that, control
plane messaging is non-time critical and far less frequent than
data plane (data plane ∼ ms, control plane ∼ s).
The data plane operation is divided into two phases:
replication phase and duplicate discard phase. Next, we discuss
the operation of each plane and the description of key elements
of the iPRP protocol in detail.
A. Control Plane
The control plane is used for exchange of messages to
establish and maintain an iPRP session. The iPRP session
establishment is triggered when a UDP packet is received at
some monitored UDP port p. In Fig. 2, UDP port p is made
monitored at t1 at the receiver, by adding it to the list of
monitored ports. This triggers the establishment of an iPRP
session, i.e., the receiver’s soft-state-maintenance functional
block (Fig. 3) adds the sender to the list of active senders
(Alg. 1).
The iPRP-capability-advertisement functional block (Fig.
3) at the receiver, sends iPRP_CAP to the control port of
the sender every TCAP seconds (t2 in Fig. 2, Alg. 2). This
message informs the sender that the receiver is iPRP enabled
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Fig. 2: Message sequence chart for typical scenario when iPRP-
capable devices are starting iPRP operation.
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Fig. 3: Overview of the functional blocks.
and provides information required for selective replication over
alternative paths. It contains: (1) the iPRP version; (2) INDs of
the network subclouds to which the receiver is connected, to
facilitate IND matching (see Section IV-D); (3) the source and
destination UDP port numbers of the packet that triggered the
iPRP-session establishment; (4) in multicast, the multicast IP
address of the group; (5) in unicast, IP addresses of all receiver
interfaces; (6) a symmetric, short-lived cryptographic key for
authentication and encryption of the iPRP header (Section VI)
Algorithm 1: (At the receiver) Soft-state maintenance
(keeps the list of active senders up-to-date)
1 while true do
2 remove inactive hosts from the list of active senders
(last-seen timer expired);
3 for every packet received on one of the monitored
ports or on iPRP Data Port do
4 if the source is in the list of the active senders
then
5 update associated last-seen timer;
6 else
7 put sender in the list of active senders;
8 end
9 end
10 end
Algorithm 2: (At the receiver) iPRP capability advertise-
ment
1 while true do
2 compute Tbackoff (Section V-F);
3 listen for iPRP_ACKs until Tbackoff expires;
4 send iPRP_CAP messages to all hosts in the list of
active senders from which no iPRP_ACKs are
received;
5 sleep TCAP − Tbackoff;
6 end
On receiving the iPRP_CAP, the iPRP-session-
maintenance functional block (Fig. 3) at the sender
acknowledges it with an iPRP_ACK. The iPRP_ACK
contains the list of sender IP addresses which are used by
the receiver to subscribe to alternate network subclouds
to receive data through SSM. In multicast, the receivers
send iPRP_CAP after a back-off period (Section V-F) to
avoid flooding. The iPRP_ACK message also serves as a
terminating message for impending iPRP_CAPs, thereby
preventing a flood (Alg. 2).
To complete the iPRP session establishment, the iPRP-
session-maintenance functional block performs IND matching
(section IV-D) and creates a peer-base entry (t3 in Fig. 2,
Alg. 3). The peer-base contains all information needed by the
sender for replication of data packets.
The second goal of control plane it to maintain an iPRP
session. To this end, the iPRP_CAP messages are used as
keep-alive messages (Alg. 3). The iPRP session is terminated
if no iPRP_CAP message is received for a period of 3TCAP .
These messages are sent to a sender as long as it is present
in the list of active senders. The list of active senders is
maintained by the soft-state-maintenance functional block by
updating the last-seen timer (Alg. 1) when a new data packet
is received. Sessions that are inactive for more than Tinactivity
are terminated.
For each new iPRP session, a corresponding iPRP session
establishment is triggered. If any of the required steps could
not be completed due to message loss or to an iPRP incapa-
bility, an iPRP session is not established and packets are not
replicated.
Addition or removal of new interfaces at the sender or
receiver is communicated by the iPRP_CAP messages and
Algorithm 3: (At the sender) iPRP session maintenance
1 while true do
2 remove aged entries from the peer-base;
3 for every received iPRP_CAP message do
4 if there is no iPRP session established with the
destination then
5 if IND matching is successful then
6 establish iPRP session by creating new
entry in the peer-base;
7 send iPRP_ACK message;
8 end
9 else
10 update the keep-alive timer;
11 end
12 end
13 end
the peer-base is updated accordingly. Specifically, when an
iPRP_CAP is received for already established iPRP sessions,
the peer-base is updated in the following ways. Newly received
INDs, which are successfully matched are added to the peer-
base. On the contrary, INDs in the peer-base that cannot be
matched with any of the received INDs, are removed from
the peer-base after confirmation from multiple consecutive
iPRP_CAPs (to handle the effect of the backoff algorithm
in Section V-F).
B. Data Plane: Replication Phase
The replication phase occurs at the sender to send out
data plane messages once the iPRP session is established. The
replication functional block (Fig. 3) on the sender intercepts all
outgoing packets destined to UDP port p of the receiver. These
packets are subsequently replicated and iPRP headers (section
V-D) are prepended to each copy of the payload. iPRP headers
are populated with the iPRP version, a sequence-number-space
ID (SNSID - unique identifier of an iPRP session), a sequence
number, an original UDP destination port, and IND. The 32-
bit sequence number is the same for all the copies of the same
packet. The destination port number is set to the iPRP data port
for all the copies. An authentication hash is appended and the
whole block is encrypted. Finally, the copies are transmitted
as iPRP data messages over the different matched interfaces
(see Alg. 4, t4 in Fig. 2).
Algorithm 4: (At the sender) Packet replication
1 for every outgoing packet do
2 check the peer-base;
3 if there exists an iPRP session that corresponds to
the destination socket then
4 replicate the payload;
5 append iPRP headers incl. seq. number;
6 send packet copies;
7 else
8 forward the packet unchanged;
9 end
10 end
C. Data Plane: Duplicate Discard Phase
The duplicate discard phase occurs at the receiver once
an iPRP session is established to ensure that only one copy
of replicated packets is forwarded to the application. Upon
reception of packets on the iPRP data port, the associated
last-seen timer is updated (see Alg. 1) and the packets are
forwarded to the duplicate-discard functional block (Alg. 5).
It decrypts the iPRP header at the beginning of the payload
using the symmetric key used in iPRP_CAP message. Then,
function isFreshPacket (Section V-E - Alg. 6) is called.
Based on the sequence-number-space ID (SNSID - unique
identifier of an iPRP session) and the sequence number, the
packet is either forwarded to the application or discarded. The
first received copy should reach the application, subsequent
copies are discarded. The replication is thus rendered trans-
parent to the sender and receiver applications. In Fig. 2 we
show two scenarios after the time t4; in one case both copies
are delivered, in the other, one packet is lost.
Algorithm 5: (At the receiver) Duplicate discard
1 for every packet received on iPRP data port do
2 get sequence number space ID (SNSID);
3 get sequence number (SN);
4 if it is the first packet from this SNSID then
5 SNSID.HighSN← SN; // Bootstrap
6 remove iPRP header;
7 reconstruct original packet;
8 forward to application;
9 else
10 if isFreshPacket(SN, SNSID) then
11 remove iPRP header;
12 reconstruct original packet;
13 forward to application;
14 else
15 silently discard the packet;
16 end
17 end
18 end
D. The iPRP Header
Fig. 4 shows the position and the fields of the iPRP header
used in data packets. The SNSID is used to identify an iPRP
session. This identifier is unique across all iPRP sessions
terminating at the same receiver, thereby allowing multiple
iPRP sessions on the same machine. In our implementation, it
is chosen as a concatenation of the source IPv6 address, the
source UDP port number of the socket to which the application
writes the packet and a 16-bit reboot counter.
The SNSID is used by a receiver to tie the packets with
different source IP addresses that belong to the same iPRP
session. When a new receiver joins a multicast group with an
already established iPRP session, it uses the source IP address
in the SNSID to uniquely identify the sender of the packets
and the source port number in the SNSID to uniquely identify
the streaming application on the sender. However, in case of a
crash and reboot of the sender, the sequence number is reset.
Then, a new reboot counter in the iPRP header differentiates
packets belonging to the new iPRP session from those of the
old iPRP session, thereby ensuring a seamless recovery at the
receiver.
To maintain the format of the iPRP header for an IPv4
implementation, we suggest repeating source IPv4 address
four times at the place of source IPv6 address. The original
destination UDP port number is included to allow for the
reconstruction of the original UDP header. The iPRP header is
placed after the inner-most UDP header. So, iPRP works well,
even when tunneling is used (e.g., 6to4).
Fig. 4: Location and fields of the iPRP header.
Like many protocols (such as DTLS, VPN, VXLAN, 4in6,
etc.), iPRP adds its own header to the packet payload. In order
to avoid packet fragmentation, we adopt the same solution
as any tunneling protocol: at the sender, iPRP reduces the
interface MTU size to the minimum of 1280 bytes required
by IPv6. In practice, typical MTU values are closer to the
IPv6-recommended 1500 bytes. This leaves a margin for the
inclusion of the iPRP and other tunneling protocol headers.
E. The Discard Algorithm
The redundant copies of a packet are eliminated by a
discard algorithm running at the receiver. In scenarios where
the packets are received out-of-order, the discard algorithm
proposed for PRP [22] delivers several copies of the same
packet to the application. The function isFreshPacket
(Alg. 6) avoids this issue. It is used by Alg. 5 to decide if
a packet sequence number corresponds to a fresh packet. We
use 32-bit unsigned integer sequence numbers, large enough
to avoid the wrap-around problem.
Algorithm 6: Function to determine whether a packet
with sequence number CurrSN corresponds to a fresh
packet in the sequence number space ID SNSID.
The test “x follows y” is performed for 32-bit un-
signed integers using subtraction without borrowing as
“(x-y)>>31==0”.
1 function isFreshPacket(CurrSN, SNSID)
2 if CurrSN==SNSID.HighSN then
3 return false ; // Duplicate packet
4 else if CurrSN follows SNSID.HighSN then
5 put SNs [SNSID.HighSN+1, CurrSN-1] in
SNSID.ListSN;
6 remove the smallest SNs until SNSID.ListSN has
MaxLost entries;
7 SNSID.HighSN← CurrSN ; // Fresh packet
8 return true;
9 else
10 if CurrSN is in SNSID.ListSN then
11 remove CurrSN from SNSID.ListSN;
12 return true ; // Late packet
13 else
14 return false; // Already seen or very late
15 end
16 end
Alg. 6 tracks the following variables per iPRP session,
identified by a sequence number space ID (SNSID):
• HighSN – highest sequence number of a packet received
before the current packet,
• ListSN – sequence-number list of delayed packets.
ListSN is bounded to a maximum of MaxLost < 231
entries. MaxLost is the maximum sequence-number differ-
ence accepted by the application. In practice, we can take
MaxLost > R × Tlate, where R is an upper bound on
packet rate of the streaming application that corresponds to
an iPRP session and Tlate is the time after which packets are
deemed out-of-date, thus irrelevant. Consequently, if a packet
is received with a sequence number that precedes HighSN by
more than MaxLost, it is deemed “very late” and dropped.
The value of MaxLost is configurable and depends on the
targeted application. For example, in our smart-grid setting,
there is a hard delay-constraint of 20 ms (any packet older
than this can be safely discarded). To be conservative, we
allow packets with the delays of up to Tlate = 50 ms. We
set MaxLost to 1024, high enough to support any realistic
PMU streaming rate.
iPRP and its discard algorithm are able to recover after
unexpected events (crashes and reboots). A problem can occur
if, after a reboot of a sender, the same sequence numbers
are reused. Then, fresh packets can be wrongly discarded
as the receiver would be deceived into believing that it had
already delivered such packets. This problem can be fixed by
imposing handshakes between senders and receivers. However,
such a solution is not appropriate if multicast is used and,
furthermore, it would violate soft-state property. Our solution
is to have a sender maintain a reboot counter that defines
different sequence-number spaces within the same sender
machine (see Section V-D). Therefore, when a new reboot
counter is encountered, the receiver creates a new SNSID,
thereby resetting HighSN. Following a reboot of a receiver,
all the receiver’s counters are initialized upon the reception of
the first iPRP data packet.
As mentioned earlier, the algorithm keeps track of one
variable and of one list per iPRP session. The most expensive
operation is searching the list (line 10). However, in practice,
ListSN is limited to few entries. The algorithm can be further
optimized for a O(1) time complexity by using a hash table
implementation for ListSN. Additionally, the algorithm is
designed to have a fixed memory usage: size(ListSN) bytes.
Before stating the correctness of the algorithm, we need to
introduce some definitions. We say that a received packet is
valid if it arrives in order or if it is out-of-order but not later
than Tlate. Formally, this means that a packet received at time
t with SN = α is not valid if some packet with SN = β >
α+ MaxLost was received before t.
Furthermore, let ∆ be an upper bound on the delay jitter
across all network subclouds. Formally, for any two packets
i, j sent over any two network subclouds k, l: ∆ ≥ (δki − δlj),
where δ denotes the one-way network delay. Also, recall that
Tinactivity is used to terminate inactive sessions (Section V-A).
Theorem 1 (Correctness of the discard algorithm). If R×∆ <
231 and R × (Tinactivity + ∆) < 231, then Alg. 6 guarantees
that: (1) no duplicates are forwarded to the application and (2)
the first received valid copy of any original packet is forwarded
to the application.
The proof is lengthy and is given in the appendix. To
understand the practicality of the conditions in the theorem,
note that Tinactivity is in the order of seconds and is much
larger than ∆. Therefore, the only condition to verify is
R× (Tinactivity + ∆) < 231, which for, say Tinactivity = 10s
and ∆ = 100ms, requires R < 2× 108 packets per second –
a rate much higher than ever expected.
F. The Backoff Algorithm
The soft-state in a multicast iPRP session is maintained
by periodic advertisements (iPRP_CAP) sent to the source
by each member in the multicast group of receivers. We want
to prevent “message implosion” at the source for groups of
receivers ranging from several hosts to millions. Failing to do
so can have a similar effect as a denial-of-service attack. The
source would be overwhelmed with processing iPRP_CAPs
if all the multicast group members would send them. Never-
theless, if the source waits too long before receiving at least
one iPRP_CAP, the start of the iPRP operation would be
delayed. This is why we also require the source to receive
an iPRP_CAP within at most D = 10s after the start of the
loop in Alg. 2 (executed periodically every TCAP = 30s).
A similar problem was studied in the literature on reliable
multicast, where ACK implosion at the source needs to be
avoided. To our knowledge, the solution that best fits our sce-
nario was proposed by Nonnenmacher and Biersack [23]. We
adopt it in our design: each receiver performs a random backoff
before transmitting an iPRP_CAP. The source acknowledges
each iPRP_CAP by an iPRP_ACK. The reception of an
iPRP_ACK before the expiry of the backoff timer inhibits
any receiver from sending its iPRP_CAP. The backoff timer
follows a flipped truncated exponential distribution (inaptly
called “exponential” in [23]), defined by a PDF on [0, D]
that increases toward D, fX(x;λ,D)
def.
= λeλx(eλD − 1)−1 ·
1{x∈[0,D]}.
Due to the back-off algorithm, a multicast iPRP sender
may not receive iPRP_CAPs from the same receiver in two
consecutive cycles. As different receivers can have interfaces
with different INDs active, the consecutive iPRP_CAPs seen
by the sender can have different INDs. In cases when an
iPRP_CAP is received from a receiver with fewer interfaces,
if the missing INDs would be immediately removed from the
sender’s peer-base, the replication on these network sub-clouds
would be adversely affected. To mitigate this problem, removal
of INDs from the peer-base is done only after confirmation
from multiple consecutive iPRP_CAPs (see Section V-A).
We implement the backoff computation of [23] by CDF
inversion. A uniform random variable U ∈ [0, 1] is obtained
via a random number generator. Next, the backoff is set to
Tbackoff = λ
−1 ln(1 + (eλD − 1)U) (Alg. 2, line 2). We pick
λ = 25/D. See [21] for a further discussion.
G. Robustness and Soft-state
iPRP is a soft-state protocol that is robust against host
failures and supports joining or leaving the hosts from the
network at any time, independently of each other. In a multicast
case, it is expected that a new iPRP-capable receiver can show
up (or simply crash and reboot) after an iPRP session with
other receivers was established. Then, the new receiver will
immediately be able to process packets received at the iPRP
data port without the need to exchange control messages.
The iPRP control-message exchange does not rely on
the availability of any particular network subcloud, making
our protocol robust to network failures. Once the soft-state
maintenance functional block learns about alternative network
subclouds, iPRP_CAP messages are sent over all of them.
Furthemore, the control plane communication to the reserved
iPRP control port is secured (see Section VI). The security
algorithm for iPRP header protection can be chosen as part of
the configuration.
VI. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The iPRP protocol design is such that it does not interfere
with upper-layer security protocols. However, in addition, we
needed to provide security for the iPRP header itself, as there
are attacks that can stay undetected by upper-layer security
protocols. Concretely, if an attacker manages to alter the
sequence-number field of iPRP packets transmitted over one
(compromised) network subcloud, the discard algorithm can be
tricked in a way that the packets from both (compromised and
non-compromised) network subclouds are discarded. Note that
similar attacks exist for PRP, where an attacker, with access to
one network, can force the discard of valid frames on another
network. For example, say an attacker has access to network
subcloud A. A PRP frame is represented as A5, where A is the
network subcloud it belongs to and 5 is the sequence number.
If A5 and B5 were received and the attacker retransmits the
frame A5 by altering the sequence number as A6, then the
actual A6 and B6 frames will both be discarded. In other
words, an unsecured PRP or iPRP could weaken the network
instead of making it more robust. Yet another argument for
protecting the iPRP protocol is that by doing so we minimize
the exposure for prospective attacks in the future.
The iPRP control messages are encrypted and authenti-
cated. This guarantees that the security of replicated UDP flows
is not comprimised by iPRP and that it does not interfere with
application layer encryption/authentication.
Specifically, iPRP_CAP messages and the corresponding
iPRP_ACK messages are transmitted over a secure channel.
The iPRP header inserted in the data packets is authenticated
and encrypted with a pre-shared key. Thus, replay attacks and
forged messages insertion are avoided.
We establish the secure channel for the transmission of
iPRP_CAP messages depending on the type of communica-
tion, unicast or multicast. Details follow below.
Unicast: In unicast mode, a DTLS (datagram transport
layer security) [24] session is maintained between the sender
and the receiver. It is initiated by the receiver upon the
arrival of the first UDP datagram from the source. iPRP_CAP
messages are transmitted within this session. So, the iPRP
capabilities of the receiver are transmitted only to an authen-
ticated source. iPRP_ACKs are not required in unicast (since
message implosion can occur in multicast only).
Unicast iPRP_CAP messages contain a symmetric key
used to authenticate and encrypt the iPRP header. This key
is updated periodically during a unicast iPRP session. Hosts
keep a small fixed number of valid past keys to prevent losing
the iPRP session because of delayed receiption of a new key.
The oldest key is discarded upon reception of a new one.
Multicast: iPRP relies on any primitive that establishes a
secure channel with the multicast group. For example MSEC
(multicast security) [25] can be used for group key manage-
ment and for establishing a group security association.
In this setting, both iPRP_CAP and iPRP_ACK messages,
as well as the iPRP headers inserted in the replicated packets,
are authenticated and encrypted with the group key. Thus, there
is no need to include an additional key in the iPRP_CAP .
VII. IPRP DIAGNOSTIC TOOLKIT
As iPRP is designed to be IP friendly, it facilitates the
exploitation of the diagnostic utilities associated with TCP/IP.
The diagnostics include verification of connectivity between
hosts and the evaluation of the corresponding RTTs (similar
to ping), the discovery of routes to a host (similar to
traceroute), etc. Furthermore, the toolkit also adds some
more tools that are specific to iPRP and it gives iPRP a
significant edge in network diagnostics and statistics collection
over PRP. The toolkit comprises the following tools:
iPRPtest <Remote IP Address> <Port>
<Number of packets> <Time period>
iPRPping <Remote IP Address>
iPRPtracert <Remote IP Address>
iPRPsenderStats <IP Address>
iPRPreceiverStats <IP Address>.
Imagine a typical scenario where an application on an
iPRP-enabled host that is subscribed to a particular multi-
cast group (G) experiences packet losses. To troubleshoot
this problem, the user at the receiving host would use the
iPRPreceiverStats tools to consult the local list of
active senders, to check for the presence of an iPRP session
associated with any host sending multicast data to group G. If
an iPRP session exists, then the tool returns the statistics of
packets received over different networks in the iPRP session.
Then, to understand if the problem is caused by multicast
routing or lossy links, the user moves to the sending host.
First, with iPRPtest and by using the remote IP address
of the receiver, the user establishes a temporary, unicast iPRP
session with the host. If successful, the iPRPping tool is used
to obtain the packet loss and RTT statistics over the multiple
networks. Also, the iPRPtracert tool is used to verify the
hop-by-hop UDP data delivery over multiple networks. For any
iPRP session between two hosts, the iPRPsenderStats is
used by the sending host to query the remote host about the
statistics of the packets accepted and dropped by the duplicate
discard functional block on that remote host. The operation of
each tool is described in details in [21].
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION
We opted for a Linux-based user-space implementation that
has the following properties: (1) Enable the selective filtering
of IP packets so that the iPRP sequence of operation can be
applied; (2) allow for packet mangling where the iPRP header
can be inserted and packets can be replicated at the sender and
duplicates can be discarded and original packet can be restored
at the receiver; and (3) minimal CPU overhead.
To this end, we use the libnetfilter_queue
(NF QUEUE) framework from the Linux iptables project.
NF QUEUE is a userspace library that provides a handle
to packets queued by the kernel packet filter. It requires
the libnfnetlink library and a kernel that includes the
nfnetlink_queue subsystem (kernel 2.6.14 or later). It
supports all Linux kernel versions above 2.6.14. We use the
the Linux kernel 3.11 with iptables-1.4.12.
The main challenge encountered in the implementation
was to ensure that the delay and processing overhead was
low. For this purpose, we categorized the various instructions
in iPRP as time-critical or non time-critical. For instance,
adding the iPRP header to a packet is time-critical, whereas
updating the peer-base to enable replication on a new network
is non time-critical. Then, we used batching of non time-
critical instructions to reduce the total number of system-calls.
In this way, we achieved a lower-overhead while maintaining
the same real-time performance.
Currently, we are deploying iPRP on our EPFL smart-grid
communication network (smartgrid.epfl.ch).
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the performance of our implementa-
tion, we are have setup a lab test-bed and do two types of
assessments. The first one is to evaluate the operation of iPRP
and its discard algorithm in different scenarios. The latter set
of experiments is to assess the processing delay due to iPRP
and the additional CPU usage used by iPRP software of our
proof-of-concept implementation. Our test bed consists of two
Lenovo ThinkPad T400 laptops with a 64-bit Ubuntu OS.
The laptops (Table I) are connected over two Ethernet based
wired networks (one via USB adapter) and one ad-hoc Wi-Fi
network. We label the interface eth0 as nwA, eth1 as nwB
and wlan0 as nwC. To evaluate the real-time operation, we
patched the Linux kernel 3.11.6 with the associated real-time
Linux patch rt29.
Component Version Specifications
CPU Intel C2Duo, 2.53 Ghz
Ethernet Controller Intel 82567LM Gigabit Card
Wireless Controller Intel Wifi N d5300
Operating System Ubuntu 12.04 LTS, 64-bit
Kernel 3.6.11-rt29 (RT-Linux Patch)
TABLE I: Specifications of hosts used in the test bed
A. iPRP Behavior in the Presence of Asymmetric Delays and
Packet Losses
Our goal here is to validate the design and implementation
of iPRP by quantifying the packet losses and delays perceived
by an application. We stress-test the discard algorithm with
heavy losses and asymmetric delays and compare the perfor-
mance with that in theory. The packet losses and delays are
emulated using the Linux tc-netem [26] tool on the test bed
described in Table I.
In Table II we summarize settings used in different scenar-
ios. To mimic the traffic created by PMUs, we send a 280 byte
UDP datagram every 20ms, long enough to have stationary
behavior. We emulate delays that are uniformly distributed
within 10ms± 5ms (small differences in network topologies
and/or loads), and within 1s ± 0.2s (significant differences
in network topologies or serious perturbations in network
functioning). We emulate both independent and bursty losses.
In both cases the overall packets loss rate is 5%. To produce
5% bursty losses with tc-netem we use Gilbert-Elliot model
[27] with p = 0.01, r = 0.19, 1 − k = 0.01, 1 − h = 0.81,
where p and r are the transition probabilities between the bad
and the good states, 1 − k is the loss probability in the good
state and 1− h is the loss probability in the bad state.
Scenario tc-netem delay : loss naturenwA nwB nwC
0 S:IL S:IL S:IL
1 Z:IL S:IL not used
2 Z:BL S:BL not used
3 Z:IL L:IL not used
4 Z:BL L:BL not used
5 S:IL S:IL not used
TABLE II: Scenarios used for performance evaluation. tc-netem
added delay : “Z” means 0 , “S” means small uniform 10ms±5ms,
and “L” means large uniform 1s±0.2s. Loss nature: “IL” means 5%
independent and “BL” means 5% bursty losses.
We use Scenario 0 to evaluate the operation of iPRP in
the presence of more than two networks. In Scenarios 1-4, we
test the discard algorithm by making asymmetric delays and
losses, thus forcing it to keep track of delayed/missing packets.
With Scenario 5, we test the expected iPRP side-benefit of
having lower average one-way network delay, given that the
iPRP duplicate-discard functional block always forwards the
first packet delivered over any of the available networks. We
measure delays and losses over individual networks and as
experienced by an application located on top of iPRP.
In Table III, we show the measurement results. We assume
that the losses on different networks are independent. Under
this assumption, the expected actual loss percentage can be
approximated with the product of observed loss percentages
on different networks. We compare the observed actual losses
(iPRP column) with the expected actual loss percentage (theory
column). A deviation would mean anomalies in the iPRP
protocol and implementation. The accordance between the last
two columns in Table III shows that iPRP performs as expected
in significantly reducing the actual packet losses.
Scen. nwA nwB nwC iPRP theory
0 5.061 4.913 5.1537 0.0126 0.0128
1 5.057 5.002 not used 0.253 0.254
2 5.132 5.059 not used 0.259 0.254
3 5.014 5.013 not used 0.251 0.249
4 5.022 4.981 not used 0.247 0.249
5 5.051 5.002 not used 0.251 0.253
TABLE III: Loss percentages in various scenarios
In Fig. 5 we show the CDF of one-way network delay for
a specific packet (diPRP ) for Scenario 5. In theory, it should
be diPRP = min(dnwA, dnwB), where dnwA, dnwB are the
one-way network delays of the same packet on network sub-
clouds A and B. What we measured matches the theory very
well. This is a confirmation of the anticipated side-benefit of
iPRP: the delays perceived by the application are improved
when iPRP is used, compared to those when only one of the
individual networks is used.
CDFs are not shown for Scenarios 1-4 as, by construction,
it is almost deterministic which network has the shortest delay.
For example, in Scenario 1 most of the times diPRP =
min(dnwA, dnwB) = dnwA.
Fig. 5: An iPRP side benefit: the delays perceived by the application
are improved when iPRP is used, compared to those when only one
of the individual networks is used.
B. Processing Overhead Caused by iPRP
In this subsection, we evaluate processing delays and the
additional CPU load when iPRP is used on the test bed
described in Table I. We conduct several runs of Scenario
1 (see Table II) and use GNU gprof [28] to assess the
average processing delay incurred by an iPRP data packet
at the iPRP sender daemon (ISD) and the iPRP receiver
daemon (IRD). In an ISD, a data packet encoutners only the
replicator function which adds the iPRP header and replicates
packets over multiple interfaces. This operation takes 0.8 µs on
average. In an IRD, a data packet encounters three functions.
The packet handler copies a packet into user-space, verifies
the fields of the iPRP header and prepares a packet for the
duplicate discard function which indicates if a packet is to be
dropped or forwarded. These operations take 0.8 µs and 0.4 µs
on average respectively. Lastly, if a packet is to be forwarded,
the iPRP header is removed and checksum is recomputed in
2.4 µs. On average, a data packet incurs a delay overhead of
4.4 µs due to iPRP.
In order to assess the additional CPU load when iPRP is
used, we perform two experiments in which we record the CPU
usage by iPRP daemons on the sender and on the receiver. The
results are summarized in Table IV. In Experiment 1 we keep
constant aggregate packet rate of 1000 packets per second (pps)
for all established iPRP sessions (1 iPRP session of 1000 pps,
2 iPRP sessions of 500 pps each, etc.). The CPU usage with
iPRP is quasi-constant at 15 % for the sender and 12 % for
the receiver. In Experiment 2 we keep a constant packet rate
of 10 pps for every individual iPRP session (1 iPRP session
- 10 pps in total, 2 iPRP sessions - 20 pps in total, etc.). At
the sender, the CPU usage increases, at first, at a rate of 0.9
% per iPRP session and the increase rate per iPRP session
decreases to 0.32 % for larger number of iPRP sessions. At
the receiver, the increase rate of CPU usage per each additional
iPRP session goes from 0.8 % to 0.22 %.
Following the results from Table IV, the additional % of
CPU usage at sender (Us) and receiver (Ur) due to iPRP can
be approximated with the relations:
Us = 3.7 + 0.28× (# of iPRP sessions) + 0.01× (packets/s)
Ur = 0.9 + 0.08× (# of iPRP sessions) + 0.01× (packets/s)
Number
Exper. 1: Aggregate Exper. 2: pps
of
of pps for all iPRP sessions per iPRP session kept
kept constant to 1000 constant to 10
sessions Send. [%] Rec. [%] Send. [%] Rec. [%]
0 (Idle) 3.7 0.9 3.7 0.9
1 14.5 11.8 4.5 2.2
2 14.1 11.9 5.6 2.4
4 15 11.3 5.7 2.3
10 15 12 7.3 3.2
20 15 12 10 5.2
TABLE IV: CPU usage with iPRP and varying loads
X. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
We have designed iPRP, a transport layer solution for
improving reliability of UDP flows with hard-delay constraints,
such as smart grid communication, industrial processes, high-
frequency trading and online gaming. iPRP is application-
and network-transparent, which makes it plug-and-play with
existing applications and network infrastructure. Furthermore,
our soft-state design makes it resilient to software crashes.
Besides unicast, iPRP supports IP multicast, making it a
suitable solution for low-latency industrial automation appli-
cations requiring reliable data delivery. We have equipped
iPRP with diverse monitoring and debugging tools, which
is quasi impossible with existing MAC layer solutions. With
our implementation, we have shown that iPRP can support
several sessions between hosts without any significant delay or
processing overhead. To achieve a low delay and processing-
overhead, we use batching of non time-critical instructions
thereby reducing the total number of system calls.
Interworking with legacy systems could be handled by
developing adequate proxies. Legacy hosts that cannot be
upgraded with iPRP software could be placed behind an iPRP
proxy that would handle all iPRP functions and could thus
communicate with an iPRP-enabled host. This would add
redundancy to the path between the iPRP proxy and the other
end of communication. Nevertheless, the iPRP proxy would
now be a single-point-of-failure. A very interesting case arises
if the legacy host is equipped with PRP. In such cases, the
solution with an iPRP proxy still applies but could be improved
using the concept of split proxies in order to remove the single-
point-of-failure. Split proxies would each be singly-attached
to the PRP LAN and to the IP network. They would insert
the iPRP header to each duplicate packet received from the
PRP LANs. The challenge, left for future work, is to design
a distributed algorithm between the split proxies in order to
ensure consistency of iPRP sequence numbers.
Our implementation is publicly available and is currently
being installed in our campus smart-grid [6]. In the future, we
intend to do extensive measurements on our smart-grid and
study the performance of iPRP in real networks.
To further reduce the delay-overhead due to iPRP, one
might think of a more efficient kernel-space implementation.
However, given the low delay-overhead of our user-space
implementation and the problems of stability associated with a
kernel-space implementation, this is not advisable. Hence, we
would like to push the implementation of iPRP functionalities
to the network adapter itself, similarly to the TCP segmentation
offload technique [29]. Also, given the slow adoption of IPv6,
porting the implementation to IPv4 can be of interest.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove the statement of Theorem 1, we need the follow-
ing lemmas.
Lemma 1. If R×∆ < 231 and R× (Tinactivity + ∆) < 231,
then the wrap-around problem does not exist.
Proof: The wrap-around problem can arise in two cases.
Case 1: A late packet arrives with CurrSN < HighSN−
231. As R×∆ < 231, the time required by the source to emit
231 packets is longer than ∆. Hence, HighSN cannot precede
CurrSN for more than 231 and this scenario is not possible.
Case 2: A fresh packet is received with CurrSN >
HighSN + 231. This means that from the point of view of
the receiver, there were more than 231 iPRP packets lost in
succession. As R × (Tinactivity + ∆) < 231, the time for
more than 231 consecutive packets to be sent is greater than
(Tinactivity + ∆). Hence, the time between reception of any
two packets differing by SNs more than 231 is greater than
(Tinactivity). Therefore, during this time the iPRP session
would be terminated and a new session will be initiated when
the fresh packet is received. Hence, this scenario is also not
possible.
Therefore, in the rest of the proof, we can ignore the
wrap-around problem and do as if SNs of received packets
were integers of infinite precision. Also, a notation such as
HighSNt− [resp. HighSNt+ ] denotes the value of HighSN
just before [resp. after] time t.
Lemma 2 (Monotonicity of HighSN). If at time t, a
packet with SN = α is received, then HighSNt+ =
max(HighSNt− , α). Therefore, HighSN increases monoton-
ically with time.
Proof: From Alg. 6, when α > HighSNt− (line 4) then
the value of HighSN is changed to α (line 7). Otherwise, when
HighSNt− ≥ α (lines 2 and 9), HighSN is unchanged, i.e.,
HighSNt+ = HighSNt− . The two cases combined together
give HighSNt+ = max(HighSNt− , α).
Lemma 3 (Fresh packet is never put in ListSN). If at time
t, a packet with SN = α is forwarded to the application then
α /∈ ListSNt′+∀ t′ ≥ t.
Proof: Let us prove by contradiction. Assume that ∃ t′ > t
such that α ∈ ListSNt′ . Hence, ∃ t1 ∈ (t, t′] when α was
added to ListSN. As t1 > t, from Lemma 2, we conclude
that HighSNt1− ≥ HighSNt+ ≥ α. Now, from Alg. 6, we
know that only SNs > HighSNt1− can be added to ListSN.
Hence, α cannot be added to ListSN at time t1. Therefore,
we have a contradiction.
Lemma 4. At any time t, HighSNt− is equal to SN of a packet
received at some time t0 < t or no packet has been received
yet.
Proof: HighSN is modified only at line 7, where it takes
the value of the SN received. Hence, HighSN cannot have a
value of a SN that has not been seen yet.
Now, we proceed with the proof of the theorem. First, we
prove statement (1). Assume we receive a duplicate packet with
SN = α at time t. It means that a packet with SN = α was
already seen at time t0 < t. Then, from Lemma 2 it follows
that α ≤ HighSNt− . Then, either α = HighSNt− (line 2) or
α < HighSNt− (line 10).
Case 1: When α = HighSNt− , the packet is discarded
according to line 3.
Case 2: When α < HighSNt− , line 10 is evaluated as false
due to Lemma 3. Hence, the packet is discarded by line 14.
Next, we prove statement (2) by contradiction. Assume we
receive a first copy of a valid packet with SN = α at time t
but we do not forward it. This can happen either due to line
3 (case 1) or due to line 14 (case 2).
Case 1: Statement from line 2 was evaluated as true, which
means that α = HighSNt− . As SN = α is seen for the first
time, Lemma 4 is contradicted. Hence, this case is not possible.
Case 2: Statement from line 10 was evaluated as false,
which means that α < HighSNt− and α /∈ ListSNt− . We
show by contradiction that this is not possible, i.e., we now
assume that α < HighSNt− and α /∈ ListSNt− . Now, there
are three cases when α /∈ ListSNt− can be true:
(i) SN = α was added to and removed from ListSN
before time t because it was seen (line 11) which is impossible
as the packet is fresh.
(ii) SN = α was added to ListSN and later removed
at time t0 < t because the size of ListSN is limited to
MaxLost entries (line 6). This means that at time t0 < t
a packet with SN = β was forwarded and β −α > MaxLost
(line 6). However, this means that the packet with SN = α
was not valid at time t0 and therefore is also not valid at time
t > t0.
(iii) SN = α was never added to ListSN. Consider the
set T = {τ ≥ 0 : HighSNτ+ > α}. T is non-empty because
t ∈ T, by hypothesis of our contradiction. Let t0 = inf T.
Then, necessarily HighSNt0− ≤ α < HighSNt0+ (say, = β).
β is the SN of a packet received at time t0. Since α is valid,
β − α < MaxLost. Otherwise, α would be invalid at time
t0, therefore at time t, which is excluded. Then we have two
subcases possible:
a) HighSNt0− < α. Then, by line 5, α is added to
ListSN, which is a contradiction.
b) HighSNt0− = α. But, by Lemma 4 a packet with SN =
α must have been received before t0 which is a contradiction
because α is a fresh packet at t ≥ t0.
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